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SEQUENTIAL DOMINATION, AUTONOMY
AND LIVING WILLS
SANDRA

H.

JOHNSON*

INTRODUCTION

Jay Katz presents a rich and detailed portrait of the doctor-pa
tient relationship that resembles Degas' Absinthe. In Degas' portrait,
as in Katz's, the two parties find themselves in a relationship that each
joined consensually although from some sense of necessity. Now en
gaged in the object of their mutual choice or need, however, they sit as
isolated individuals, gazing away from each other, not touching, silent.
Degas leaves us to speculate as to the forces that brought his
couple together at the cafe and those that keep them apart. I The
power of Katz's work in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 2 is
that he not only presents the human costs of the frustrated relation
ship but also identifies precisely the barriers that have confined pa
tients and doctors within so unsatisfactory a world. In so doing, Katz
has revealed not only the tradition of silence of the medical profession
als but also the patients' fear of conversation as dual causes of the
failure of communication. These obstacles are more than historical,
although their long existence contributes to their continuing strength.
They are nourished by the continuing professional domination of the
patient-physician relationship and by the resultant distrust of physi
cians by their patients (pp. 95-103). Katz presents an insightful analy
sis of the role of law in confirming, rather than reordering, the
hierarchical domination of physicians over patients. Thus, Katz con
tradicts a not uncommon perception of law as libertarian in compari
• Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law and Assistant Professor of
Law in Internal Medicine, St. Louis University School of Medicine; A.B., St. Louis Univer
sity, 1973; J.D., New York University, 1976; LL.M., Yale Law School, 1977. I gratefully
acknowledge the assistance of my colleague Carolyn Jones who reviewed previous drafts of
this essay.
I. Although the display of Absinthe caused a scandal in London in 1893 because it
was viewed as portraying a prostitute seated in a cafe with her customer, the painting could
easily be interpreted as a portrayal of any breached relationship including that of a long
married couple who have separated psychologically from each other.
2. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter
KATZ].
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son with the paternalistic ideals of medicine. Although, as Katz notes,
"Anglo-American law has, at least in theory, a long-standing tradition
of preferring liberty over custody" (p. 2), when confronted with the
conflict between liberty and custody in informed consent, judges
"fashion[ed] a doctrine of informed consent that has secured for pa
tients the right to better custody but not to liberty-the right to choose
how to be treated" (p. 49).
Although the patients apparently won the battle between liberty
and custody in the doctor-patient relationship through recognition of
the requirement of informed consent, that victory is only illusory, ac
cording to Katz. Such apparent victories will continue to disguise de
feat so long as the legal doctrines or procedures continue to rest upon
the fallacy that patients can have autonomy over treatment decisions
absent a radical reordering of the patient-physician relationship:
"Challenging the long-standing tradition of silence requires nothing
less than uprooting the prevailing authoritarian value and belief sys
tems and replacing them with more egalitarian ones" (p. 28). Because
the current hierarchical patient-physician relationship rests on both an
overestimation of professional expertise and an underestimation of pa
tients' capacity for autonomy, a fundamental change in the nature of
this relationship requires change on both sides.
Law will continue to confirm the domination of patients by doc
tors unless the courts and the legislatures become aware that facially
neutral legal mechanisms often enhance professional authority at the
expense of personal autonomy. Absent this awareness, patients will
continue to be betrayed by illusory victories in their battles for auton
omy over medical decisionmaking.
The validity of Katz's thesis concerning the role of law in con
firming the traditional structure of the doctor-patient relationship and
its impact on patients' autonomy is borne out in its application to leg
islation concerning decisions about death and dying. The living-will
statutes, which, aside from the guardianship, are the most common
legislation on the refusal of life-sustaining treatment by adults, 3 explic
3. Living-will legislation had been adopted by 38 states and the District of Columbia
as of January 1987. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-l to -10 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010
.100 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp.
1986); 1985 Conn. Acts 606 §§ 1-6 (Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509
(1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2321 to -2430 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.15
(Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327(D)-1 to
-27 (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to 4508 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
§§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (West Supp.
1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.I-.11 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,
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itly elevate the choice of the individual to primacy in the competition
for control over these medical treatment decisions. 4 The living-will
legislation thus promises patients control over their own medical treat
ment as well as a shield against professional domination. These may
be empty promises. The living-will legislation is hampered in achiev
ing its goal of securing autonomy for patients in a large number of
cases because its structure treats as inevitable the domination of the
professional over the patient and "protects" the patient from conversa
tion, to use Katz's term, that may actually enhance the patient's
autonomy.
Rather than treating patients and physicians as coparticipants in
an effort to evaluate alternatives, this legislation assumes a patient
physician relationship of sequential domination, in which first the doc
tor and then the patient dominates and controls the decisionmaking to
the exclusion of the other. Thus, it affirms rather than challenges the
long-standing tradition of silence. It is important to examine the liv
ing-willlegislation from this perspective because such an analysis calls
into question facile exhortations to physicians and patients that they
use the living will as an opportunity to communicate with one an
otherS and because it reveals the subtle, but significant, risks hidden in
the structure of this very popular mechanism. 6
101 to 109 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1986); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 22, §§ 2921-2931 (West Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601
to -614 (Michie Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1986); Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 495.010-055
(Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206
I
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:2 to 16
(Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1981 & Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 97.050-.090 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §§ 3102-3111 (West Supp. 1987); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1985); S.c. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op
1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 4590(h) (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -117 (Supp. 1986);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262, tit. 13, § 1801 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE §§ 54
325.8:1 to :13 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (WestSupp.
1986); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp.
1986); WYo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1986). In comparison, less than a dozen
states had adopted statutes authorizing medical agents. See infra note 54.
4. For example, several statutes provide that adult persons have "the fundamental
right to control the decisions" relating to their own medical care. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-2
(1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.02 (West Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 39-4502 (1985);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28.101 (1985).
5. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.055(4) (Vernon Supp. 1986), which provides
"[c]ommunication regarding treatment decisions among patients, the families and physi
cians is encouraged." See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.02 (West Supp. 1986).
6. "One New York group has distributed millions of living wills. The columnist who
writes 'Dear Abby' reports receiving tens of thousands of requests for copies each time she
deals with the subject." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL

116

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:113

At its best, the living will protects personal choice against profes
sional - both legal and medical- interference. The living will affirms
the central value of the individual patient as both the subject-object
and ultimate arbiter of his or her own treatment decisions. The living
will may allow to be done what ought to be done by providing the
comfort of written documentation of the patients' desires at a time
when they can no longer speak for themselves. At its worst, however,
the living will, now available in a convenient "permanent mini-will
version ... in [a] new credit-card size,"7 reduces a sometimes complex
judgment to a slogan: No machines!
The apparent simplicity of the living will conceals the real oppor
tunities for misunderstanding and the range of discrete decisions that
often must be made. For example, a hospital recently described a situ
ation in which a doctor brought the living wills of two young and
healthy men to be "put on file" in the emergency room so that they
would not be resuscitated should they suffer heart failure at the hospi
tal from injuries incurred in an automobile accident or some other
event. When the hospital called these men, they were shocked at what
the doctor had done.
The widely circulated mini-will provides: "If there is no reason
able expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or mental disa
bility . . . I direct that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by
artificial means and heroic measures."8 Which "extreme physical dis
abilities" does this cover? Burns? If so, how severe? Quadriplegia?
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND
LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONMAKING 140 (1983).
7. The mini-will is available from Concern for Dying and is provided in appreciation
for a contribution to the organization.
8. See supra note 7. This language is not representative of language used in the sam
ple living wills offered in the state statutes. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. 54-325.8:4 (Supp.
1986):
Declaration made this
day of
(month, year). I,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, willfully and voluntarily make known my desire that my dying
shall not be artificially prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, and do hereby
declare:
If at any time I should have a terminal condition and my attending physician has
determined that there can be no recovery from such condition and my death is imminent,
where the application of life-prolonging procedures would serve only to artificially prolong
the dying process, I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be
permitted to die naturally with only the administration of medication or the performance of
any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide me with comfort care or to alleviate
pain.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such life-prolonging
procedures, it is my intention that this declaration shall be honored by my family and
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Amputation? Of what particular limbs? Blindness? What means are
artificial? This is not to say that individuals should be barred from
making treatment decisions, including refusals of treatment, in these
situations. Rather, these decisions, if not made in an emergency situa
tion, usually would require more information and reflection than a
quick-and~easy very general document requires. If the treatment deci
sion must be made in an emergency situation, a preference in favor of
treatment at least to stabilize the patient, restoring the capacity for
decisionmaking, would ordinarily prevail.
If the importance of the document is that it reveals an individ
ual's personal values as pro-refusal or pro-treatment, it is not so much
an exercise of autonomy as it is a labelling. As a label for the informa
tion of persons who actually must make treatment decisions on behalf
of the patient, it does not operate in the automatic or "binding" man
ner that the public perceives. Nor does the simple label or value
choice necessarily identify a single correct decision among available
options in particular circumstances.
This essay begins with a consideration of the context of the living
will and its part in the process through which society is developing a
series of resolutions to claims for autonomy in regard to medical treat
ment. The context of the legislation sets the stage for an examination
of its structure, using Katz's analysis of informed consent as a model.
physician as the final expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment
and accept the consequences of such refusal.
I understand the full import of this declaration and I am emotionally and mentally
competent to make this declaration ...
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.(Signed).
See also Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.015(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986):
DECLARAnON
I have the primary right to make my own decisions concerning treatment that might
unduly prolong the dying process. By this declaration I express to my physician, family
and friends my intent. If I should have a terminal condition it is my desire that my dying
not be prolonged by administration of death-prolonging procedures. If my condition is
terminal and I am unable to participate in decisions regarding my medical treatment, I
direct my attending physician to withhold or withdraw medical procedures that merely
prolong the dying process and are not necessary to my comfort or to alleviate pain. It is
not my intent to authorize affirmative or deliberate acts or omissions to shorten my life
rather only to permit the natural process of dying.
Signed this
day of _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Signature._ _ _ _ _ _ __
City, County and State of residence_ _ _ _ _ _ __
Most of the living-will statutes do not require that the language of the statutory sample be
used and do not make invalid documents that fail to use the statutory language, although
the statutes do provide for severance of invalid clauses. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. 54
325.8:4 (Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.015(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Severalorgani
zations have distributed living wills, including the Catholic Health Association.
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The statutory structure reveals an overbroad deference to professional
discretion and a misconception of autonomy as control that undercut
the statutes' protection of patient autonomy. The essay assesses the
likelihood that physicians and patients will succumb to the superficial
attractions of silence and insulation so readily available in the struc
ture of the living will. In its conclusion, the essay offers suggestions
for improving the lot of physicians and patients within the confines of
the decisions involved.
I.

THE CALL FOR LEGISLATION

The living will is an expression of the drive for autonomy and
individual control as against professional dominance over decisions re
garding medical treatment. The popularity of the living wills and the
legislation legitimizing these documents indicate the depth and
breadth of the demand for individual control and the rejection of the
"professionalization" of death. 9 The legislation also manifests a rebel
lion against the "tyranny of technology" 10 and the dread of technol
ogy controlled by others. It responds to the primal fear of premature
burial in which one hovers in a physical limbo between life and death
(or afterlife) entrapped, not by a coffin, but by "machinery" that one is
helpless to release. It also stems from the anxiety, particularly com
mon among the elderly, over the expense involved in dying an "artifi
cially" prolonged death. The living will offers a shield against the
psychological nakedness that is demanded in judicial procedures that
examine the previously expressed and unexpressed desires of the now
incompetent patient and the motives of family members who seek offi
cial permission to stop treatment.
The living will substitutes for these fears the image of control by
the individual rather than professionals. Individual control is particu
larly appealing here. It reflects the personal nature of a decision on
the use of medical treatment, especially when such treatment presents
both harm and benefit (p. 94). The characterization of treatment and
9. Professional control of death is supported by a claim to special expertise on the
part of medical or legal procedures. The reach of the professionalization of death is evident
in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. BJudworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) in which the court speaks of the financial and emotional drain suffered by the
family "awaiting the medico-legal death of a loved one." [d. at 618 (emphasis added).
10. Of course, technology cannot itself tyrannize human beings, as it remains incapa
ble of so human an action. The sense of the tyranny of technology, however, is more than
anthropomorphic; rather, it expresses as well the domination of the expert, armed with the
power of technological expertise, over the individual who is the subject of the treatment.
Veatch, Autonomy's Temporary Triumph, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at 38.
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its results as either harmful or beneficial is dependent upon the indi
vidual's values. The impossibility of characterizing the result in many
cases without an understanding of the individual's perspective is evi
dent in the basic question of whether the result of "more life" or pro
longing life is valuable or detrimental to a particular person. Whether
a longer life is a harm or a benefit depends upon the individual's evalu
ation of the nature of that time. What is likely to enter that evalua
tion, depending upon the individual involved, is whether the extension
promised by certain treatments will be an extension of suffering, of
ability or inability to interact with friends and family, or of "this" life,
barring passage to the "next."
Deference to individual control is attractive as well, however, be
cause it is compatible with the values given primacy in what has been
described as an age of social freedom. II A high degree of deference to
individual moral choices may lead to claims for "protection" from
participation, or interference, by others in the process by which the
choices are made. This protection from others during the decision
making process itself reflects the skepticism of the authority or persua
siveness of moral reasoning that has characterized this age of
individual freedom.12 Reliance on personal choice allows the institu
tions that sanction particular choices to claim that it is not they who
decided to remove life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent pa
tient. Rather, the institutions - whether they be the courts, the legi.s
lature, the hospitals, the doctors or the family - are merely media for
the expression of the desires and wishes of the only apparently silent
patient.
Although decisions to discontinue or continue treatment for par
ticular patients are made in a variety of forums, the most public of
these has been the courts. In many cases, the concept of autonomy,
identified by the courts as an appropriate decisionmaking base and em
bodied in substituted judgment, operates as described. The institution
is merely a means through which the silent patients exercise choices
once it is discovered through an examination of their previously ex
pressed or implied desires. \3 When the patient has never been capable
II. See Capron, Ironies and Tensions in Feeding the Dying, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Oct. 1984, at 32.
12. See generally Callahan, Autonomy: A Moral Good, Not a Moral Obsession, HAS
TINGS CENTER REP.. , Oct. 1984, at 40.
13. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 747,
751-52,370 N.E.2d 417, 428, 431 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,70,355 A.2d 647, 663
(1976); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 470-75, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 546-47 (App. Div. 1980);
In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 131-32, 660 P.2d 738, 748 (1983).
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of exercising judgment on his or her own behalf,14 however, the right
of self-determination is only poorly served by reference to substituted
judgment, if at all. 15 In these latter situations, the personal choice ra
tionale is a sham. Such dishonesty provides dangerous comfort.
Although a "best interest" approach has its own deficiencies, reliance
on substituted judgment in these latter cases does nothing to remedy
the problems.
The courts have been troubled not only by the question of how a
decision to withdraw or withhold medical treatment is to be made, but
whether that decision is permissible and falls within appropriate
boundaries of individual choice. 16 Because of their sense of frontier
policymaking, judges have repeatedly called upon the legislatures to
determine the appropriate boundaries. 17 Courts have described the
legislature as better suited for this task because the legislature can take
a broad view, can consider a variety of scenarios, and can utilize ex
pertise. ls Several courts have commended the task to the legislature
because the legislature can weigh competing views and is a more
majoritarian decisionmaker. 19 The expectations of the courts for legis
lative relief, however, will not be met for several reasons.
First, the state legislatures will not deal with the hard cases. The
living-will legislation has been the single response of most state legisla
tures to the question of discontinuation of life-sustaining medical
14. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 751-52, 370 N.E.2d at 428-30.
15. Capron, supra note 11, at 32.
16. See, e.g., Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. \038, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647.
17. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980) ("[I]t is the type
issue [sic] which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum, where fact finding can
be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested institutions ... can be presented and
synthesized."); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 344,486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (\985) ("Legislature is
better able than any other single institution to reflect the social values at stake"); Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d at 139, 660 P.2d at 752 ("as these issues necessarily involve society's moral stan
dards as well as legal and medical issues, the Legislature is the most capable of assessing the
views of the people of this state").
18. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 370, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67 (1981) ("Unlike the
Legislature, the courts are neither equipped nor empowered to proscribe substantive or
procedural rules ...."). See also Satz, 379 So. 2d at 360.
19. See, e.g., Conroy, 98 N.J. at 344, 486 A.2d at 1220, which states:
Perhaps it would be best if the Legislature formulated clear standards for resolv
ing requests to terminate life-sustaining treatment for incompetent patients. As
an elected body, the Legislature is better able than any other single institution to
reflect the social values at stake. In addition, it has the resources and ability to
synthesize vast quantities of data and opinions from a variety of fields and to
formulate general guidelines that may be applicable to a broad range of situations.
See also Satz, 379 So. 2d 359, 360; John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth,
432 So. 2d 611, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Satz, 379 So. 2d at 360).
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treatment,20 This instrument requires that the patient be competent at
the time of the execution of the documenVI The legislatures thus fail
to provide any answers for the Saikewicz cases in which the silent pa
tient has never been competent to indicate a choice and in which the
limitations of the substituted judgment analysis as simple fact finding
are most clear. Nor have the legislatures been decisive in handling the
most recent of the difficult treatment decisions - the question of the
appropriateness of discontinuing nutrition when provided by medical
means. 22
Second, the living-will legislation has not reached very broadly
among possible treatment decisions. The living-will statutes typically
confine the declaration to cases in which the patient is terminally ill
and to treatments that are ineffective in remedying the patient's fatal
illness or condition. 23 Thus confined, the living-will legislation gov
erns only that individual decision that is most easily perceived as ra
tional: the decision to refuse medical treatments that offer no chance
of cure. In fact, a choice to pursue medical treatments that prolong
the dying process of an individual who is incompetent24 might popu
larly be viewed as irrational because of the emphasis on interaction,
choice, and thought as a measure of humanness.
Third, the limitation of the legislation to situations in which the
patient is terminally ill and has expressed his or her choice of treat
ment reflects the inclination of state legislatures to be reactive rather
20. See supra note 3.
21. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(a) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.04(1) (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-1 (1985); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 459.025 (Vernon Supp. 1986); but see, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3803 (Supp. 1986), which
provides, "[i)f any person is a minor or an adult who is physically or mentally unable to
execute or is otherwise incapacitated from executing" the document, it may be executed by
the parent of a minor or the legal guardian of the declarant.
22. Several statutes exclude nutrition from the definition of procedures that may be
refused through a living will. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(b) (West Supp. 1986);
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5) (1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.015(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5)(b) (West Supp. 1986); and WYO. STAT. § 33-26-144(a) (iii)
(Supp. 1986). Indiana excludes "the provision of appropriate nutrition and hydration."
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-4 (Burns Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). These provisions
should not be read to extend beyond the living will and to prohibit the withdrawal of
medically provided nutrition in all circumstances. See, e.g., Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487
So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
23. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(3) (1984); IDAHO CODE § 39-4503(4) (1985);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, \o2(c) (1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.025 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
24. Many of the living-will statutes confine their effectiveness to patients who were
competent at the time they executed the document but who are incompetent at the time
the treatment decision must be made. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (1985); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 459.025 (Vernon SUpp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-\03(1) (1986).
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than leading in sensitive areas. By the time most of the state legisla
tures finally acted, the courts had already established that the termi
nally ill, once-competent patient who had expressed a clear choice to
refuse life-sustaining treatments was well within the bounds of accept
able deference to the individuaJ.25 Rather than identify the outer
boundaries of individual choice, the legislatures merely acted within
the framework that the courts had established. Of course, if the living
will is seen as simply giving legislative approval to an extra-judicial
procedure for the refusal of treatment, it does relieve the courts of
"easy" cases they might otherwise have to decide and does protect
families and others from judicial proceedings that offer no benefit to
the patient. The legislation, however, still demonstrates the unwilling
ness or inability of legislatures to relieve the courts of establishing ap
propriate boundaries.
Still, many courts have looked to the legislatures for a better or
more legitimate solution than the courts are able to provide. 26 These
courts attribute to the legislatures a level of expertise and analysis that
generally is not reflected in the reality of legislative practice on the
state leveJ.27 Legislatures do not always listen to the experts, arbitrate
the disputes, and come to a decision. Rather, the process is often one
of political compromise. Some courts implicitly have recognized the
compromising nature of the legislative process in their identification of
the majoritarian nature of legislatures. 28
Precisely because the legislatures reflect the rule of the majority,
however, deference to the legislature for boundary-setting may be in
appropriate. Autonomy is a value that protects the individual from
the majority;29 thus, the view of the majority should not be the final
determinant of the boundaries of individual choice, although the ten
sion between the role of the individual and the role of society in the
area of privacy has never been adequately resolved. To the extent that
the right to refuse medical treatment is based on a constitutional right
to privacy,3D the legislature cannot redefine or narrow that right be
yond constitutional requirements, whatever they might be. At the
25. Thirteen ofthe thirty-five states with living will legislation enacted the statutes in
1985. Otten, New "Wills" Allow People to Reject Prolonging of Life in Fatal Illness, Wall
St. J., July 2, 1985, at 35, col. 4.
26. See supra note 17.
27. See supra note 19.
28. See supra note 19.
29. Callahan, supra note 12, at 40.
30. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743,
379 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,40,355 A.2d 647,663 (1976); In re
Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (1978).
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least, the courts retain the responsibility to review the legislative ac
tion in light of the demands of the constitutional norm. 31
Legislation that has been drafted or influenced by the experts in
the field will bear an expert's mark, and the legislative solution may
rest upon assumptions concerning the authority of experts. The re
sulting structure of the legislation may then reflect traditional expert
layman relationships, reflecting the public's love-hate relationship with
professionals in which laymen are fearful of contradicting professional
expertise but resentful of professional control (p. 144). This ambiva
lence toward professional control, coupled with the competing claims
of the professions and popular demand for individual control, sets the
stage for compromise in the living-will legislation. The key compro
mise is evidenced in the typical living-will statute's structure that has
doctors and patients taking turns at controlling critical decisions, es
tablishing a relationship of sequential domination. 32

II.

THE REALM OF PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT

In an early article on Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. University
Board of Trustees,33 Katz attributed the failure of the doctrine of in
formed consent to the fact that "in delegating unspecified discretion to
the medical profession to make judgments about patients' self-determi
nation, the court did not appreciate the futility of its endeavors, for it
gave an undefined task to a group that had neither the experience nor
the commitment to self-determination" (p. 62). Although his later dis
covery of an amicus brief submitted to the Salgo court by the Ameri
can College of Surgeons caused him to recast the actors in his analysis,
Katz still argues that "only self-conscious reflection can make it clear
that such contradictory intentions as 'full disclosure of facts' and
'[professional] discretion' are reconcilable only in the kingdom of
dreams" (p. 63). The strong, unrestricted affirmation of patient auton
31. Capron discusses the negative implications of resting the right to refuse treat
ment on constitutional grounds rather than upon tort and contract. Capron, Borrowed
Lessons: The Role of Ethical Distinctions in Framing Law on Life-Sustaining Treatment,
1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 647, 657-58 [hereinafter Capron, Borrowed Lessons]. See also Dinino
v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 327, 684 P.2d 1297 (1984). In Dinino the Washington Supreme
Court considered a claim that the state's living-will statute violated Dinino's constitutional
right to privacy because it suspended the effect of the living will during pregnancy. The
court held that the claim was not justiciable because the plaintiff was "neither pregnant nor
suffering from a terminal condition." Id. at 331, 684 P.2d at 1300. It thus reversed the
lower court's holding that the provision was unconstitutional.
32. See supra text at p. 115.
33. Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 137
(1977).
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omy that underlies informed consent theory and that appears in the
landmark cases 34 was abandoned in the structure of the doctrine of
informed consent as it finally emerged (pp. 80-92). The courts aban
doned their promise, according to Katz, when they deferred to profes
sional discretion and control the selection of the information that
should be given to the patients concerning particular treatments (p.
69).35 Although there were many motives for deference to profession
als, including a concern for the physician's economic well-being, a pri
mary rationale was the perceived necessity of relying on professional
wisdom and knowledge in medical decisionmaking. The living-will
legislation offers only an illusory triumph for autonomy because it
similarly defers to professional judgment both inappropriately and too
completely, at a point critical to the effectiveness of the claim of
autonomy.
The living-will legislation generally confines the effect of a living
will to situations in which the patient is terminally ill and in which the
available treatments only prolong the dying process. 36 The statutes
generally defer to professional judgment the determination that a pa
tient's condition and treatment options fall within these limitations.
The living-will statutes vary in the treatment limits established
for the operation of the document. As previously noted, several living
will statutes exempt medical procedures to provide nutrition and hy
dration from the medical treatments which the living will may con
trol. 37 This exclusion has more to do with legislative compromise and
judgment than physician dominance. 38 Other treatment-centered pre
34. See KATZ, supra note 2, at 60-80, (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
784 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 154 Cal.
App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957), Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093
(1960».
35. Katz also discusses other implications of the court's choice of negligence law,
rather than battery, for informed consent cases. These implications include the failure of
damages to remedy dignitary injuries standing alone.
36. See, e.g., Adams & Adams, An Overview of Georgia's Living Will Legislation, 36
MERCER L. REV. 45-55 (1984); Note, To Die or Not to Die: The New York Legislature
Ponders a Natural Death Act, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 650-63 (1985); Comment,
Changing Attitudes in Florida's "Right to Die" Law, 14 STETSON L. REV. 375, 381-84
(1985).
37. See supra note 22.
38. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, for example, in November, 1984,
issued Guidelines for Legislation on Life-Sustaining Treatment, which generally supported
living-will legislation, but maintained that nutrition and hydration should not be included
among life-sustaining treatments that may be refused through use of the document. This
does not indicate that Catholic doctrine categorically opposes the withdrawal of nutrition
or hydration in all circumstances. See, e.g., McCartney, Catholic Positions on Withholding
Sustenance for the Terminally Ill, HEALTH PROGRESS, Oct. 1986, at 38. The Judicial
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conditions, however, do indicate a misplaced reliance on professional
expertise. The Arkansas statute, for example, provides that only treat
ments that the doctor finds "extraordinary" may be refused through a
living will. 39 The weighing of harm and benefit involved in a conclu
sion as to whether a treatment is extraordinary is clearly a patient's
and not a professional's task. As Katz observes, "[t]he weighing of
benefit and harm, which are intentioned and dependent on individual
preferences, can only be carried out by patients with the assistance of
their physicians. It cannot be assigned solely to physicians no matter
how pure their altruistic intent" (p. 94).
In addition to treatment limitations, however, most living-will
statutes confine the operation of a living will to patients whose condi
tions meet a particular statutory definition of terminal illness. 4O These
definitions suffer from several conceptual flaws that flow both from
inappropriate deference to the medical profession and from a lack of
clarity in the role of the status of terminal illness as a limit on individ
ual choice. The Missouri and Indiana statutes, for example, provide
that the living will is effective only when a physician finds that the
patient's death will occur within a "short time" whether or not avail
able treatments are provided. 41 Montana requires that a terminal con
dition is one which "will, in the opinion of the attending physician,
result in death within a relatively short time."42 This definition gives
to the physician authority to answer a question that is not entirely a
matter of professional judgment. An individual's evaluation of a peCouncil of the American Medical Association decided unanimously at its meeting in
March, 1986, that even if death was not imminent, it "would be ethical for doctors to
withhold 'all means of life prolonging medical treatment,' including food and water, from
patients in irreversible comas ...." Reassessing Care ofDying, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1986,
at B7, col. I. See also, Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 440 n.38, 497
N.E.2d 626, 638-39 n.38 (1986) ("The A.M.A.'s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs'
position allows the withdrawal of life-prolonging medical treatment including 'medication
and artificially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration.' " (quoting
A.M.A.'s statement titled: "Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treat
ment" (March IS, 1986)), quoted in, Rasmussen v. Fleming, No.2 CA Civ. 5622, slip. op.
at 11-12 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 25, 1986).
39. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801-3802 (Supp. 1986). See also MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-103(b) (1984) which provides: "Withdrawal of life sustaining mechanisms shall
mean the cessation of use of extraordinary techniques and applications, including mechani
cal devices, which prolong life through artificial means."
40. See infra notes 41-42.
41. Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010(6) (Vernon Supp. 1986): A terminal condition is "an
incurable or irreversible condition which, in the opinion of the attending physician is such
that death will occur within a short time regardless of the application of medical proce
dures." See also IND. CODE ANN. § 50-9-102 (1985).
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-102 (1985) (emphasis added).
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riod of time as "short" depends on the goals and values of that individ
ual. The same objective time frame can be perceived as either short or
long, depending on sUbjective factors such as the presence or absence
of pain.
Other living-will statutes attempt to define a terminally ill patient
as one who, in the opinion of the physician, will die within a particular
period of time. 43 Wisconsin, for example, specifies that a terminal
condition is one "that reasonable medical judgment finds would cause
death within thirty days."44 Asking such a question of a physician as
if there were always an answer ignores the real presence of uncertainty
in medical decisionmaking (pp. 165-206). Should a "good doctor"
take the rule of the statute seriously and refuse to certify someone as
terminally ill when he is unable to render a professional judgment with
any reasonable certainty concerning the number of days remaining for
his patient? What level of certainty or probability is acceptable? Is
the acceptable level of certainty or probability also a question that
must be deferred to the doctors? Or should the "good doctor" simply
play the game established by the statute and certify the patient as ter
minally ill when, in the doctor's opinion, or the patient's, further treat
ment is undesirable?
Further, it is not uncommon that treatments present a probability
of benefit or "cure" rather than a guarantee of either success or failure.
In the face of this uncertainty, a broader role for the patient in the
determination of the preconditions for operation of the living will is
essential. Although not self-evident, the determination of the presence
of terminal illness is itself a question that involves an assessment of
risk and a balancing of the benefits and burdens of treatment that
might reduce that risk. If the patient has a particular cancer that re
sponds to chemotherapy fifty percent of the time, should the patient be
considered terminally ill and the patient's living will be understood as
43. See also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 363,486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (1985), which used
a predicted one-year lifespan as a limit on compliance with refusal of medically provided
nutrition. In a New York Times article on post-Conroy treatment of patients, the
Ombudsman charged with the task of initially deciding whether to allow removal of medi
cally provided nutrition from nursing home patients, denied approval in the first case
brought to him because it was not clear that death would occur within one year, as the
Conroy court required. The patient was in an irreversible coma and had clearly indicated
previously her desire not to be maintained in a vegetative state. Although three physicians
testified that she had less than a year to live, two physicians appointed by the Ombudsman
concluded that the patient could live for years. The Ombudsman concluded that "medical
experts find it impossible to state with authority that [the patient] will die within a year."
Ombudsman Bars Food-Tube Removal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at B2, col. 1. See infra
note 46.
44. WIse. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(8) (West Supp. 1986).
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a refusal of this treatment? If the treatment is successful twenty-five
percent of the time? Less than ten percent? These questions cannot be
answered by medical expertise alone. Statutes that give doctors con
trol over the determination of whether a patient is terminally ill often
inappropriately defer to professional judgment mixed questions of ex
pertise and personal values.
The statutory treatment of "terminal illness" as though it were
solely a question of fact also ignores the lack of agreement concerning
the purpose or validity of some notion of terminal illness as a limit on
the patient's right to choose to refuse treatment. 45 Does the patient
with end-stage renal disease who refuses hemodialysis fall within the
limit? The patient receiving nutrition through a gastrostomy tube due
to permanent dysfunction of the esophagus? The patient in the early
stages of a slowly progressing terminal cancer who develops pneumo
nia and refuses antibiotics? A very elderly patient suffering from a
confluence of chronic diseases that may include diabetes, heart disease
and progressive kidney failure? These patients will die sooner rather
than later if the treatments they refuse are not given. Is it the nature
of the disease or illness that creates the boundaries on choice? Should
the boundaries be the same for competent patients as for incompetent
patients? If terminal illness is chosen as a boundary on the individual
choice of the incompetent patient, what function is that boundary
serving?
The legislatures have failed to confront a critical issue in the pro
cess of establishing boundaries on the choice to refuse treatment. 46
45. Some of the confusion regarding the role of terminal illness as a boundary on the
right to refuse treatment may arise from the mistaken placement of this right under the
same analytical scheme as the right to choose abortion. Capron analyzes the differences
between the choice of abortion and the choice to refuse treatment. He concludes that the
right to refuse treatment based on
the right of privacy is the same for all patients; it does not grow or diminish
depending on the patient's condition. For example, a competent patient with can
cer who decided to discontinue the chemotherapy believed by his physicians to
offer his only hope of overcoming an otherwise fatal disease would be exercising
his right of privacy - that is, his authority to decide whether to accept or reject
medical interventions. There should be no suggestion in the law that a patient's
right to make this choice only arises when he or she becomes permanently uncon
scious or is near death despite medicine's best efforts to prolong life.
Capron, Borrowed Lessons, supra note 31, at 658.
46. Several courts have acted in what may be called a "legislative capacity" in de
signing detailed procedures for the legitimization of decisions by patients in the future to
refuse treatment. The New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Conroy is a recent example.
In acting "legislatively" this court set as a boundary a requirement that the death of the
incompetent nursing home patient, who may have previously indicated a refusal of life
prolonging treatments and for whom the question of whether to provide nutrition medi
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They have tried to avoid the complex issue of the relationship of the
individual and society in regard to refusal of treatment. Although the
statutes repeat the now familiar refrain that the individual's right of
self-determination is limited by the state's interests in life and medical
ethics, they do not explore these limitations. The exploration of these
boundaries within the legal system remains for the courts.
Deferring to the medical profession the question of whether a par
ticular individual is terminally ill thus allows the professional's values
to dominate: "Just as patients bring different values to bear on their
ultimate choice, so do physicians, although doctors' value judgments
are often obscured by their homogenizing all values under the single
rubric of medical judgment" (p. 96).
One cannot rely on the "good faith" of the physician in the appli
cation of the indeterminate statutory language of the living-will legis
lation to a particular situation (p. 94). Because there is "no one clear
path to well-being," one cannot rely entirely on a presumed "identity
of interests" between physician and patient to assist the living-will leg
islation in its achievement of its goal of protecting individual control
over medical treatment decisionmaking (p. xviii). If this is so, all that
the legislatures have accomplished by enacting such legislation is to
shift the final decisionmaking authority from one profession (as repre
sented in the guardianship proceedings of the courts) to another (the
physicians). Professional control over an individual's decision to re
fuse medical treatment may remain practically unaltered by these
statutes.
III.

THE REIGN OF INDIVIDUAL CONTROL

Once the physician has established that the patient is within the
limits that the statute allows the physician to determine, the individual
has complete control over the decision to refuse treatment. This high
degree of individual control grows out of the public's demands for a
shield against professional domination. It may also be viewed as an
effort to equalize the position of the patient as against the physician by
granting the patient his or her own counterbalancing area of domina
tion. Thus equally armed, the patient and the physician are then set
upon each other to make decisions as best they can.
Of course, autonomy is not subsumed completely by the concept
of individual control. Individual control is at best a poor relative of
cally has arisen, must be estimated to occur within one year. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 496
A.2d at 1232.
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autonomy but it is a tangible manifestation, and so becomes attractive
in itself. The equation of autonomy with control may not be fair to the
more sophisticated concept of autonomy in ethics. An awareness of
the popular notion of autonomy, however, is important to an analysis
of the likely impact of living wills upon the relationships of physicians
and patients. 47 To understand the impact of the substitution of indi
vidual control for autonomy, a comparison of this truncated notion
with Katz's more sophisticated analysis of autonomy is helpful. In
contrast to the one-dimensional popular view of individual control,
Katz separates autonomy into two dimensions: self-determination and
autonomy. Katz defines self-determination as "the right of individuals
to make their own decisions without interference from others" and
defines autonomy as "psychological autonomy" which denotes "the
capacities of persons to exercise the right to self-determination" (p.
105). This separation supports Katz's attention to the individual's
decisionmaking process and his call for a duty of reflection and for
respectful dialogue. In contrast, the living-will statutes elevate docu
mentation over conversation. They encourage individuals to make de
cisions concerning refusal of treatment in the lawyer's office rather
than the doctor's office, by filling out a form rather than engaging in
open discussion with persons involved in the process.
In some situations, for example when the living will is executed
by a healthy individual in anticipation of the unpredictable, that may
be the best that can be done. But in many situations, there are other,
possibly more difficult, paths that may be taken. Simple refusal be
comes the easier road, and true autonomy supported by reflection and
conversation with other persons becomes the road less traveled. Giv
ing each aspect of the decision (that is, ultimate sovereignty and exer
cise of that sovereignty) equal stature strengthens claims of a right to
exclude others from the process.
The creation of a realm of individual control shielded from par
ticipation by others ignores the widely held skepticism of the capacity
of individuals to make their own medical decisions. This skepticism
affects both physicians and patients. In anticipation of the perceived
incapacity of patients, physicians may manipulate the boundaries of
the arena in which patients may exercise their control. In anticipation
47. "While it is not altogether fair to hold a good concept sensibly deployed to the
test of its proof against popular misuse, concepts must always be used in some culture
unless they are to remain solely in dictionaries and textbooks. How they react with that
culture may tell us more about their inherent possibilities than any purely conceptual anal
ysis could reveal." Callahan, supra note 12, at 41.
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of their own weakness in the face of doctors' expertise, patients either
may avoid necessary dialogue with their physicians or may defer en
tirely to their physicians' judgment. Katz himself admits that "human
psychological capacities for autonomy are limited ...." (p. 111). His
solution to that limitation is not to ignore or to submit to it as living
will legislation does, but to advocate "respectful conversation" that
will enhance the autonomy of the patient. Katz eloquently defends his
call to conversation and reflection as necessary to true autonomy. The
need for conversation is especially acute in the particular types of deci
sions over which the living will is to govern.
The service of a living will upon the physician as a substitute for
conversation will block the physician's understanding of the patient,
which is itself essential to implementation of the patient's choices in
the living will. If statutory terms such as "benefit" or "terminal condi
tion" may be interpreted by the physician in a manner that respects
the individual patient's values, the physician must have the opportu
nity to understand how the patient perceives the situation and what
the patient values in the portion of his or her life remaining. Further,
most living-will statutes allow the patient to add clauses to the docu
ment that may expand its scope considerably. For example, statutes
that exclude nutrition from the definition of medical treatments that
may be refused by means of a living will frequently would allow the
patient to add a clause specifically refusing medically-provided nutri
tion. These statutes, however, would not give the document its statu
tory effect as to this clause. 48 In these cases, the physician either could
decide to abide by the patient's expressed wishes or could seek a judi
cial order concerning the action. In either case, the physician's under
standing of the reasons for or meaning of the patient's expression
would be relevant and would increase the likelihood that the patient's
choice would be understood and satisfied.
If the living will has a broader impact on the nature of medical
decision making and if its scope is expanded in practice, it will mute
open discussion of the morality of the choices that may become avail
able. There is a social dimension to the life of an individual even in
decisions as private as medical ones. Merely mechanical observance of
patients' self-determination easily can be a refuge from the sometimes
painful consideration of other moral values; for example, those that
may be associated with the family or broader community.49 The im
48. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.05 (West Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 459.015(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986); and WYo. STAT. § 33-26-145(d) (Supp. 1986).
49. Callahan, supra note 12, at 41.
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pact of conversation, discussion, and persuasion between physician
and patient is not necessarily one-way. Just as patients are influenced
by physicians, physicians may be influenced by patients and may gain
insight into human nature and the complexity of moral choices. Doc
tors may find their own views challenged and may change.
The sequential domination of physician and patient legitimized
by these statutes will not change fundamentally the hierarchial nature
of doctor-patient relationships, a nature that discourages the exchange
of relevant information. Of course, many of the living-will statutes
explicitly encourage patient-physician conversation, but these provi
sions alone will not offset the negative effect of the structure of the
legislation upon the relationship.
If the world of doctor and patient would be as silent and isolated
as depicted, one may be skeptical that patients and doctors will suc
cumb to the superficial attraction of conducting their relationship
through an exchange of documents. Again, Katz's analysis of the na
ture of the relationship between patient and physician substantiates his
claim that relying on "the fictional propensity of physicians to discuss
with patients is dangerous nonsense" (p. 29) and reveals why the same
is true in the context of the living-will legislation.
IV.

THE ATTRACTION OF SILENCE

As one aspect of the informed-consent dynamic, the decision to
refuse life-sustaining treatment must contend with the tradition of si
lence powerfully presented by Katz. Because these particular deci
sions involve choices with regard to death or choices made by patients
either facing imminent death or in contemplation of their death, the
tradition of silence is at its strongest. Katz alludes to the difficulty
physicians have in communicating a dire prognosis to individual pa
tients. Although this reluctance may be based on an expressed desire
to spare patients the distress of knowing their conditions, Katz attrib
utes the reluctance more to the inability of the doctors themselves to
confront the prognosis. 50 In addition, physicians may avoid informing
the patients of the fatal nature of their condition because they believe
such a revelation would be harmful and anti-therapeutic (p. 20).
Doctors are not alone in refusing to speak honestly with an indi
vidual who confronts impending death. Lawyers share this inade
quacy and have their excuses as well. Friends and family also may
50. Katz quotes a physician as commenting, .. It is not the patient who cannot toler
ate hearing the truth. I could not tolerate telling my patients the truth." KATZ, supra note
2, at 19.
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disguise their knowledge of the patient's prognosis with false assur
ances. If it is so common to avoid discussions of death, the execution
of a living will by the terminally ill patient realistically cannot be ex
pected to alter the pattern of avoiding dialogue since the necessary
decisions have been "taken care of."
At the same time that doctors are silent toward their patients,
patients have been silent toward their doctors. Anyone doubting the
existence of the patients' silence need only read any of the newspaper
physician-columnists to see that patients frequently prefer to write the
columnist for advice rather than ask their own doctors simple ques
tions concerning the effect of prescribed medications or the risks and
effectiveness of surgery their own doctors have scheduled. One expla
nation for this may be a patient's desire to avoid imposing on a "busy"
doctor.
Katz offers another explanation, however, for the silence of pa
tients toward their physicians. Katz argues that patients fear conflict
with their physicians because "good" patients comply with doctor's
orders while only "bad" patients question the doctor's authority.51
Patients are afraid that if forced to justify their decisions they will lose
control because of the doctor's greater expertise (p. 163). Rather than
telling the doctor that they have decided to discontinue medication,
for example, they simply do it. Accordingly, patients are likely to exe
cute a living will and give it to a family member or lawyer to give to
the doctor only when it is needed.
As much as patients resent the professionalization of death, doc
tors resent being ordered by their patients. Presentation of the living
will, if presented as a fait accompli by the patient to the doctor, may
itself result in the closing off of conversation and the relegation of the
decision, along with the document, to the filing cabinet. 52 If physi
cians and patients are already inclined to avoid conversation, institu
tionalization of such an inadequate relationship becomes not only a
potential outgrowth of living will legislation but unfortunately a likely
one.
51. A patient's feeling of being either good or bad may arise from the impact of
transference and countertransference in physician-patient interactions. KATZ, supra note
2, at 142-50.
52.
If all final authority is vested in patients, the danger is great that in situa
tions of either a total refusal to give an account of one's reasons or an unwilling
ness to explore one's possible confusion - when the need for conversation is
greatest - doctors will wittingly and unwittingly give up on conversation and
patients prematurely because they have been stripped of all power to stop even
the patient's most inexplicable self-destructive course.
KATZ, supra note 2, at 163.
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CONCLUSION

The traditional reluctance of patients and physicians to interact
on an honest and reflective basis cannot be cured with the stroke of a
pen. The temptation for lawyers is to leave the reordering of the rela
tionship to the parties - the physicians and the patients. No doubt
the medical profession, by changing its education and training, and the
patients, in demanding information and taking responsibility, must
take the lead. Katz has revealed, however, the significant, though
often unconscious, effect of law in institutionalizing professional domi
nation and maintaining the tradition of silence.
Some situations governed by the living will may be beyond the
reach of effective conversation. These include cases, such as those de
scribed previously, in which a person with no foreseeable proximity to
death or incapacity signs a living will to govern the unpredictable. In
these cases, conversation between doctor and patient may have to take
place in such an unreal context that it is ineffective to cause substantial
reflection by either the doctor or the patient. Dialogue may result in
the communication of relevant information, however, such as a doc
tor's blanket refusal to comply with living wills. In light of the signifi
cant risks of misunderstandings and indeterminacy of a living will
executed in anticipation of unpredictable events, a proxy, designated
by the patient while competent could assist in the interpretation of any
document executed by the incompetent patient or could perform a
decisionmaking function.
With a proxy chosen by the patient, the physician, who often may
be unfamiliar with the now-incompetent patient, has a source of im
portant information about the patient's choices which may be more
accurate than a simple document might reflect. The proxy also serves
as a necessary agent who can force or encourage the doctor to admit
and reveal that there are choices to be made. 53
Proxy decision making has its own difficulties, of course. Families
53. The advantages and disadvantages of proxy decisionmaking in this context are
discussed in the following articles: Martyn & Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives/or the
Terminally Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power 0/ Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779
(1984); Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 985 (1984) [hereinafter Appointing an Agent]; Note, Proxy Decisionmaking for the
Terminally Ill: The Virginia Approach, 70 VA. L. REV. 1269 (1984). Legislation on proxy
decision making has the advantage of conforming to the custom of the medical system in
referring treatment decisions to kith-and-kin substitutes in cases of the patients' incompe
tency. See, e.g., Capron, In/ormed Consent to Catastrophic Disease Treatment and Re
search, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 424-25 (1974). Because this custom is so firmly
established in medical practice, physicians may continue to be greatly influenced by the
kith-and-kin substitute even when he or she directly contradicts the patient's living will.
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are not always the benign social unit of mutual support that we would
like to assume. The well-being of the individual patient-member is not
always the primary concern of the family; nor does the family always
have the capability to act in a patient-centered manner. Patient-desig
nated proxies, however, generally will be less subject to these obstacles
and may serve as valuable participants in medical treatment
decisionmaking.
At the least, state legislatures should proceed to authorize proxy
decisionmaking as an alternative to the living will. Absent such legis
lation, attorneys may want to attempt to use the state's durable power
of attorney statute to appoint a proxy. While this method may not be
effective to create a proxy with authority to make medical treatment
decisions,54 the appointment may be useful in identifying an individual
whom the client desires to be his guardian should a guardianship be
sought,55 or to indicate clearly that particular kith-and-kin proxies do
not have authority to speak on his behalf. Planning of this sort is
particularly important for the adult client who may be engaged in per
sonal relationships not recognized as marital relationships and who
may not want parents or other traditional proxies to control. Even in
circumstances in which this factor is not present, there may be dispute
among family members concerning treatment, which, in the absence of
a designated proxy, may have to be resolved in court. 56
In other situations, the opportunity for conversation between the
patient and the doctor, prior or as a supplement to the execution of a
living will, does exist. This may occur when an adult of any age has a
condition that is potentially life-threatening. A similar situation oc
54. The durable power of attorney, available in most states, may serve as a mecha
nism for the appointment of a proxy decisionmaker, which appointment will survive the
incompetency of the principal. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 486.550-.595 (Vernon Supp.
1986). It is unclear, however, whether the principal may delegate health care decisionmak
ing through the durable power of attorney absent an express authorization for such delega
tion in the statute. Only a few states have legislation specifically authorizing medical
agents for health care decisionmaking. These include among others, California (CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West Supp. 1986»; Colorado (COL. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (Supp.
1986»; Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2501-2508 (1983»; Pennsylvania (20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5607 (Purdon Supp. 1986»; and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 54-325.1:1-8:12 (1986». These statutes are subject to some of the same deficiencies as
living-will legislation insofar as they attempt to limit the effectiveness of the appointment to
situations in which the principal is terminally ill.
55. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 475.050 (Vernon Supp. 1986), which provides that
"the court shall consider the suitability of appointing ... [a]ny eligible person ... nomi
nated in an instrument in writing signed at [the incompetent person's] request, before the
inception of his incapacity or disability, at a time within five years before the hearing when
he was able to make and communicate a reasonable choice."
56. See Appointing an Agent, supra note 53, at 994-95.
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curs in the case of an elderly individual who may be subject to condi
tions that threaten severe physical or mental deterioration. At this
stage, if the patient is aware of this diagnosis, conversation between
the patient and doctor concerning the choices available can be quite
beneficial to the patient's well-being. Conversation between doctor
and patient would also tend to reveal the doctor's view of his or her
own role in caring for the terminally ill patient. This would allow the
patient to learn of conflicts that are best resolved prior to the patient's
incompetency, perhaps by engaging a different doctor.
The ability of law alone to encourage such conversation is lim
ited. One opportunity that does exist, even within the structure of the
living-will statutes, is that afforded the courts interpreting those stat
utes. A physician's determination of whether the patient meets the
preconditions for the operation of the living will should be based on
the patient's expressed choice, if known. Giving patients a role in the
determination of the existence of the preconditions would encourage
patients to contact their doctors and let their desires be known rather
than allow the doctors to make these decisions on their behalf or re
quire the courts to intervene. In situations in which a particular
course is likely, the patient may execute a living will that more explic
itly defines the preconditions required. This is especially critical in
light of the uncertainty in diagnoses of terminal illness, the ambiguity
of the term, and the lack of a defined purpose for the terminal illness
boundary.
Lawyers will playa significant role in the implementation of the
living will because many clients will request that they execute this doc
ument. In this task, the lawyer should not always simply resort to use
of the statutory form. Rather, the lawyer must advise the client of the
limitations of the document and encourage discussion between patient
and doctor. There are many reasons for this advice, including the role
of the doctor in determining the preconditions that trigger the docu
ment and the implementation of added clauses, such as refusals of
medically provided nutrition. In addition, if the client's doctor refuses
to comply with living wills because of the doctor's own ethical beliefs,
the client should be made aware of this while the opportunity to
choose a different doctor still exists. Moreover, if the client's family
opposes the client's living will, the physician and lawyer can be the
patient's allies, with the living will serving as evidence of the mutual
consent among them. Of course, lawyers have to devise a cost-efficient
manner of communicating this information. In this regard, while law
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yers push doctors to take the time to inform patients fully, we might
do well to follow our own prescription.
Finally, neither the courts nor the legislatures should consider
their task complete merely because of the recognition of the living will.
Clearly, the courts will continue to be involved in this area in inter
preting the statutes and in dealing with situations not covered by the
living-will legislation. In light of the deficiencies of living wills, the
courts should not establish policies that implicitly require that patients
sign living wills as the only effective method through which their
choices will be honored. Nor should they limit the scope of individual
choice to that set by the legislature in the living will.
At the bottom line, patients must have final authority to make the
decisions concerning their medical treatment. But the nature of the
process for reaching this bottom line is important for the quality of life
of the patient and the physician. Katz concedes that his call for the
enhancement of autonomy through conversation is paternalistic (p.
128). The same can be said about criticisms of living-will legislation
based on a belief that its mechanical form will have a negative impact
on the relationship of physicians and patients. Acknowledging that
the call to conversation is paternalistic, however, is not to concede that
this paternalism destroys the individual's autonomy, as may indeed be
the case in other conflicts. Rather, the insistence on conversation as
an element of the process of autonomy may equally be characterized
as creating an environment for the exercise of autonomy. The legal
doctrine of informed consent focuses not solely upon consent, but
rather upon decisionmaking, whether consent or refusal, and upon the
communication of relevant information to the patient for careful con
sideration. There is a critical link between information and a particu
lar treatment decision. It is this link that the living will totally
abandons. Without that interaction, patients will make decisions to
refuse or to demand medical treatment in a vacuum deprived of neces
sary information (p. 209).
The call to conversation in the face of the history of silence is one
that undoubtedly will be met with a healthy skepticism. 57 It is cer
tainly idealistic to create a duty of reflection and dialogue while simul
57. The tradition of silence has severely undermined patients' trust of physicians in a
quiet way that erupts during conflicts such as these. Katz quotes Richard C. Cabot, a
physician:
We think we can isolate a lie as we do a case of smallpox, and let its effect die with
the occasion that brought it about. But is it not common experience that such
custorr..S are infectious and spread far beyond our intention and beyond our con
trol? They beget, as a rule, not any acute indignation among those who get wind

1987]

SEQUENTIAL DOMINATION. AUTONOMY AND LIVING WILLS

137

taneously calling physicians and patients to a new level of
conversation. One may argue that individual control should not be
sacrificed in favor of an idealized relationship. Nor should the individ
ual be sacrificed, however, to an empty notion of autonomy that brings
with it isolation and abandonment and which can be "undermined by
hopeful promises, blind misconceptions, and false certainties" (p. 141).

of them (for 'how,' they say, 'could the doctor do otherwise'), but rather a quiet,
chronic incredibility which is stubborn.
KATZ, supra note 2, at 25.

